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Should Skepticism Be 
Discredited?
Abstract
In our day-to-day life and experiences, when one doubts or questions unusually, he is 
branded a skeptic and consequently resisted. Skeptics, over the years, are seen as people 
whose basic mood is that of doubt; those who deny absolutely that true knowledge is 
possible. Although this is not completely true of skepticism, the present work demonstrates, 
though arguably, that skepticism is more of a philosophical method of inquiry; an 
epistemological attitude towards knowledge but whose goal is indeed certainty, although 
it selects a serious doubt concerning all knowledge as the starting point of the inquiry into 
the possibility of true knowledge. It can rightly be said that the work displays the paradox 
of skepticism. The word ‘paradox’ originates from a Latin term paradoxum, which has a 
Greek association paradoxon, or paradoxos, signifying “conflicting with expectation.” 
Thus, the word paradox signifies a tenet or proposition contrary to received opinions. 
It is a statement or sentiment that is seemingly contradictory or opposed to common 
sense and yet, perhaps true in fact. The need for this work is necessitated by the fact 
that in the present age, it has become no longer the case that the best way to certainty 
is only by accepting entirely all that one is told, especially when such comes from a sage 
or a tradition. Obviously, we live in a dispensation where almost every human situation 
challenges the human rational faculty hence the tendency to change facts and hang-on to 
lies generates serious fever in every thinking mind. The result of this work therefore is that 
imperatively, the work demands that whoever wants knowledge should proceed through 
doubt. The method through which this work arrives at this conclusion is the analytic 
process of discussion and presentation.
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I. Introduction
We live in a dispensation where almost every human situation challenges the human rational faculty. It is a world where the tendency to change facts and hang-on to lies generates 
serious fever in every thinking mind. Whether in religion, politics or socio-
economic and cultural life, truth-telling has gradually become a thing of 
the past in the world that we live in. It has become a costly price for one 
to take a facelift what one’s neighbor narrates, because what is solemnly 
handed down as truth may, after investigation, be an all-round package 
of distorted facts. It no longer sounds funny that the society in which 
we live has developed the habit of telling lies at all circumstances such 
that confidence is fading out in human interactions. Consequently, there 
comes the need to develop the skeptic’s mind-set and attitude if we must 
live and interact happily with one another in the same society. Sextus 
Empiricus was aware of this situation years ago that he did not fail to 
sound the beauty and value of skepticism. Commenting on his view about 
skepticism, Samuel Stumpf has this to say:
Skepticism originated in the hope of attaining mental peace 
or calmness. People have been disturbed by the contradiction 
of things and plagued by doubt as to which alternative they 
should believe. They were struck, however, by the different 
conceptions of truth different philosophers had proposed. 
They also noticed that people have discovered the truth (and 
these, the skeptics called dogmatists), those who confess they 
have not found it and also assert that it cannot be found (and 
this they also considered as dogmatic position), and finally 
those who persevere in the search for it. Unlike the first two, 
says Sextus, ‘the Skeptics keep on searching.1
Based on these, skeptics thought that if they could, by investigation, 
determine truth from falsehood, they could then attain tranquility of 
mind. Skepticism, therefore, is not a denial of the possibility of finding 
truth, nor is it a denial of the basic facts of human experience. Rather, it is 
a continuous process of inquiry in which every explanation of experience 
is tested by a counter experience. The fundamental principle of skepticism, 
according to Sextus, is that to every proposition an equal proposition 
is opposed. It is a consequence of this principle, he says, that “we end 
1 Samuel Stumpf, Philosophy: History & Problems (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1994), 120.
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by ceasing to dogmatize.”2And this perhaps amounts to justification of 
belief according to Robert Audi.3
There is no gain-saying that skepticism is necessary if we must be freed 
from every form of dogmatism. To this extent, we must seek to deepen the 
skeptic’s mind-set and attitude if we must conquer this ugly situation and 
get ourselves out of the mess it provides. Since the target of skepticism is 
to challenge the alleged grounds of accepted assumptions, in order to know 
whether the claims they make are indubitable or necessarily true, it follows 
then to say that skepticism is a method of inquiry; hence a skeptic is someone 
who is unsatisfied with what is given and still is looking for truth.
It is unfortunate to observe that many today have capitalized on the fact 
that skeptics deny what appears acceptable to others to say that skeptics 
are those whose basic mood is that of doubt. And following that, they call 
skeptics doubting Thomases. Also coupled with the concern that skeptics 
doubt and question ‘extraordinarily’ people say they must be resisted. But 
the truth remains that skeptics were far from denying everything including the 
evident of sense perception. Like Sextus would say, those who say skeptics 
deny appearances “seem to me to be unacquainted with the statements of our 
school.”4This means that the skeptics did not question appearances but only 
the account given of appearances.
Since we believe that skepticism is a philosophical enterprise that meant 
something rather different, namely, seekers or inquirers of certain knowledge, 
in this paper, our attempt would be to demonstrate how this is possible. To 
be sure, the ancient skeptics were doubters, but they doubted in order that 
they may know. For instance, they doubted that Plato and Aristotle had 
succeeded in discovering the truth about the world, and they had these same 
doubts about the Epicureans and Stoics. But for all their doubt, they were, 
nevertheless, seekers after a method for achieving a tranquil life.5
It is based on this explanation therefore that skepticism, in our context, 
would demand that whoever wants true knowledge should proceed through 
doubt. Ordinarily, one would have thought that the best way to certainty is 
by accepting entirely all that one is told especially when it comes from a sage, 
or a tradition. But as a philosophical method of inquiry and epistemological 
attitude towards knowledge, skepticism has its goal as certainty, though it 
selects a serious universal doubt concerning all knowledge as the starting 
2 Ibid., 120-121.
3  Robert Audi, Belief, Justification and Knowledge: An Introduction to Epistemology (Belmont, 
CA: Wadsworth, 1988), 13.
4 Ibid., 121-122.
5 Ben Okwu Eboh, Basic Issues in the Theory of Knowledge (Nsukka: Fulladu Publishing 
Company, 1995), 16.
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point of a theory of knowledge. History of philosophy is replete with the 
assumption that knowledge was possible and could be found. But skepticism 
questions such possibility and hence offers a methodology on how to behave 
without the criterion of truth.
II. Various Notions of Skepticism and Applications in History
Originally, in the history of philosophy, the word skepticism is understood 
as a Greek word, which is derived from the verb skeptestai and which means 
“to inquire,” or “to investigate.” It is also from the Greek noun skeptikos, 
which is equally concerned with investigation. However, in the history 
of philosophy, peoples’ attitudes to skepticism depend more or less on 
their interpretation, understanding and applications of these basic words; 
hence there are variegated notions of skepticism and application in the 
history of philosophy.
What seems to be the first misconception of skepticism derived from 
misconstruing of the root meaning of the term ‘skepticism’ and these have 
led to some dangerous over-generalization where the skeptics are said to 
be denying almost everything. Obviously, the old Greek word, skeptikoi 
from which skeptics is derived, means something rather different namely, 
“seekers” or “inquirers” (of knowledge).6
A philosopher like Bittle would interpret the root word of skepticism 
to mean that “the mind cannot overcome doubt; that the human reason 
is not only perverted and diseased but is in itself fallacious, weak and 
unstable.”7 This for him means that the mind is incapable of attaining 
knowledge, i.e. real certitude in knowledge is impossible. Ben Okwu Eboh 
also thinks that
What the sceptic is saying, in effect, is that the mind is incapable 
of attaining knowledge, that is, that real certitude in knowledge 
is impossible. In short, the sceptic holds that claims to 
knowledge are shaky because any supposed truth that is offered 
as a candidate for knowledge might conceivably be false. This is 
why, in the view of skeptics, the only logical and rational thing 
we have to do is to suspend our judgement always because of a 
real doubt as to the truth of our judgement.8
6 Stumpf, 120.
7 Celestine Nicholas Bittle, Reality and the Mind (Milwaukee: The Bruce Publishing Company, 
1936), 26.
8 Eboh, 16-17.
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There is no gain saying that the above misconception is one of those ones 
which tend to ignore the vivid explanations of skepticism that the earliest 
skeptics themselves offered such as Pyrrho. Pyrrho was popular for his 
doctrine of ataraxia. Ataraxia is a Greek word which is literally translated as 
“imperturbability,”“equanimity,” or “tranquility.” Although the word ataraxia 
originally meant “freedom from worry and anxiety,” i.e., “a state of calmness 
of mind in the face of seemingly intractable disagreement,” later application 
of the term by Epicurus and his group, and the Stoics made it acquired varied 
senses in accordance with one’s philosophical theories. That is to say that the 
mental disturbance that prevented one from achieving ataraxia varied among 
the philosophers; hence each philosophy had a different understanding as to 
how to achieve ataraxia.9
The Pyrrhonian skeptics tried to avoid committing themselves on any and 
all questions, even as to whether their arguments were sound. However, for 
them, those who claim for themselves to judge the truth are bound to possess 
a criterion of truth. This criterion, then, either is without a judge’s approval 
or has been approved. But if it is without approval, whence comes it that it is 
trustworthy? For no matter of dispute is to be trusted without judging. And, if 
it has been approved, that which approves it, in turn, either has been approved 
or has not been approved, and so on ad infinitum.10Skepticism for them 
therefore, was ability, or mental attitude, for opposing evidence both pro and 
con on any question about what was nonevident, so that one would suspend 
judgement on the question.11 It was this state of mind that necessitated the 
state of ataraxia; a state of quietude, or unpertubedness in which the skeptic 
was no longer concerned or worried about matters beyond appearance.12
Ataraxia requires the suspension of judgment. Among the Pyrrhonists, 
ataraxia was necessary for bringing about eudemonia (happiness) for a person, 
representing life’s ultimate purpose. Their method of achieving ataraxia was 
through achieving epoche. 
Epoche is the suspension of judgement. And it is not the same as ataraxia 
although the latter is relationally induced or brought about by the former for 
the sake of eudemonia. The issue is that we are first brought to epoche and 
then to ataraxia.
For Sextus Empiricus, skepticism was not a denial of the possibility of 
finding truth, nor was it a denial of the basic facts of human experience. 
9 Stumpf, 120.
10 Sextus Empiricus, Against the Logicians, trans. Robert Gregg Bury (London: W. Heinemann, 
1935), 179.
11 Richard Bett, Sextus Empiricus: Against the Physicists (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2012), 221.
12 Ibid., 121.
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Instead, it was “the view that questions whether any of our beliefs can be 
supported by adequate or sufficient evidence.”13 This form of skepticism shows 
that skepticism is a continuous process of inquiry in which every explanation 
of experience is tested by a counter experience. 
In the early hours of Platonic dialogues, Socrates was seen questioning 
the knowledge claims of others. And in the Apology, he stated that all he 
really knew was that he knew nothing. Obviously, this Socratic skepticism 
was not a complete denial of the possibility of true knowledge. Rather it 
was a method where the mind refrained from quick judgement or accepting 
anything which it was not too sure of.
Furthermore, Socrates’ enemy, the Sophist Protogoras, also did 
contend that “man is the measure of all things, of what is, that it is, and 
what is not, it is not.”14 This thesis showed a kind of skeptical relativism. 
For it was taken that no views were ultimately true, but each was merely 
one man’s opinion.
Gorgias wrote a book to prove that nothing exists, that even if 
anything were to exist, it would be impossible to know and communicate 
it. This does not still show that Gorgias totally denied the possibility of 
true knowledge. Unfortunately, many have misconstrued this to be that 
Gorgias totally denied the possibility of true knowledge. The truth is that 
Gorgias’ form of skeptical nihilism questions the capacity of the human 
mind to comprehend the nature of reality. It looks like what Scott Aikin 
refers to as regress problem in epistemology which states that if one has 
good reasons to believe something, one must have good reason to hold 
those reasons are good. And for those reasons, one must have further 
reasons to hold that they are good, and so a regress of reasons looms.15
In Augustine’s Contra Academicos, which was influenced by the works 
of Cicero and the Platonism of the Middle Academy, Augustine stated that 
“skepticism can be completely overcome only by revelation. And from 
this standpoint, philosophy was considered faith seeking understanding 
(fides quarens intellectu).”16 This is really a Fideist voice, the type that will 
be heard from the Fideist of the Renaissance period.
Michael de Ayguem Montaigne is of the view that his own skepticism 
was a “New Skepticism.” Stumpf states this thus: “Montaigne looked upon 
himself as an unpremeditated philosopher; one who was not confined 
13 Eboh, 16-17.
14 Plato, Theaetetus, trans. Joe Sachs (Newburyport, MA: R. Pullins Co., 2004), 166d.
15 Scott F. Aikin, Epistemology and the Regress Problem (New York: Routledge, 2011), 2.
16 Juan Comesaña, and Peter Klein, “Skepticism,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
(Winter 2019 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/
entries/skepticism/.
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intellectually to some rigid set of ideas within which his thoughts and life 
must be expressed.”17
Furthermore, in his Essays, Montaigne confessed that even though he 
was one of those who normally condemned such stories concerning ghosts 
and prophesies, he has come to find out that “it is a foolish presumption 
to slight and condemn things as false because they do not appear to us as 
probable...”18
Consequently, in the follow-up work, Apologie de Raimond, Montaigne 
held that the reason why we should not condemn things as false just because 
they do not appear probable to us is that the criteria employed to determine 
standards of judgments are themselves open to question and doubt, unless 
God gives us some indubitable first principles and makes our faculties 
reliable.19
The truth Montaigne is saying is that unaided by divine grace, all of 
man’s achievements even those of the most recent sciences become dubious. 
But contending that personal and cultural sentiments influence people’s 
judgments and that the senses are unreliable, Montaigne further suggests 
that we should judge with moderation, reverence, and prudence and with 
greater acknowledgement of our ignorance and infirmity compared with the 
infinite power of nature.20
In the same vein, Francisco Sanches in his book Quad Nihil Scitus in 1581 
used classical arguments to doubt science in Aristotelian sense, arguing that 
giving necessary reasons for causes would lead to infinite regress because 
true knowledge of the behavior of nature cannot be attained.21
The most fundamental skepticism in the modern time was launched by 
David Hume between 1711 and 1776. Before Hume was René Descartes 
(who published his Meditationes in 1641), and was known for his methodic 
skepticism or methodic doubt. Descartes’ doubt had the chief aim of 
providing rules for clear and orderly thinking. It was an effort to help the 
mind overcome the deception of the senses. Earlier in his work, Descartes had 
lamented saying,
Whatever I have up till now accepted as most true, I have 
acquired from the senses or through the senses. But from time to 
17 “Pyrrhonian Skepticism,” in The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, ed. Robert Audi, 738-
741 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
18 Richard Popkin, Philosophy Made Simple (London: Made Simple Books, 1981), 168.
19 Joseph Omoregbe, Epistemology (Theory of Knowledge): A Systematic and Historical Study 
(Lagos: Joja Educational Research and Publishers Ltd., 1991), 168.
20 Stumpf, 120.
21 Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Paul Edwards (New York: Macmillan, 1967), 101.
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time, I have found out that the senses deceive. And it is prudence 
never to trust completely, those who have deceived us once.22
Consequently, Descartes formulated four methodic principles or rules which 
would always govern people’s discussions and to help them minimize fallacies so 
that one would never misplace truth for falsehood or vice versa. The climax of 
Descartes’ methodic doubt was the discovery of the indubitable truth: Cogito ergo 
sum – I think therefore I am (Je pense dunc je suis). This truth was the fertile ground 
upon which Descartes proved the existence of things, man and God included.23
One should recall that the British empiricists were generally known for 
their dictum: “nihil est in intellectu quod prius non fuerit in sensu” meaning that 
nothing is in the intellect that first was not in the senses. Through this dictum, 
they contended that experience is the origin of all knowledge. Hume was led to 
this form of Empiricist skepticism in the end, by his early faith in reason. He did not 
think that adherence to reason could lead the mind to any absolute truth. Hence, 
he taught that in nature, there existed no absolute principle derivable by reason 
upon which depends the meaning and the knowledge of reality. 
For Hume, object in nature existed separately; the movement from what is 
(a matter of fact) to what we ought to do or required (the qualities we place on 
objects and actions) was a logical jump. Hence there was no necessary logical 
inference from what is, to what ought to be. There was no necessary connection 
between cause and effect. Thus,
all our reasoning concerning causes and effects were derived from 
nothing but custom; and belief was more properly an act of the 
sensitive, than of the cognitive part of our natures.24
Further still, Hume stated that the principle of causality could neither be 
demonstrated nor known by intuition. The idea of cause for him, therefore, was 
derived from the principle of frequent association of things that generally go 
together. It was by this association that we knew that things were contingently 
caused by the other. 
Hume was the most thorough-going skeptic among the empiricists that his 
sweeping doubts about causality, the self, substance and metaphysical knowledge, 
Kant says, woke him up from his dogmatic slumber.25
22 René Descartes, Discourse on Method and Meditations on First Philosophy, trans. Donald A. 
Cress (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1999),12.
23 René Descartes, The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, ed. John Cottingham (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1985), 13.
24 Stumpf, 213.
25 Immanuel Kant, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, trans. and ed. Gary Hatfield 
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Kant attempted to synthesize the rationalists’ and empiricists’ proposition 
into his synthetic a-priori knowledge. He posited space and time as the two a priori 
categories presupposed in knowing. Finally, Kant divided reality into phenomena and 
noumena, holding that while the phenomena (things-as-they-appear) are knowable, 
the noumena (things-in-themselves) are unknowable.26
The contemporary period further witnessed the linguistic skepticism of Fritz 
Mauthner, whose critique of language in Analysis of Language led to a total skepticism 
about the possibility of genuine language. For him, language was both social and 
individual, and showed only what linguistic conventions were used at a given time, 
and what features of experiences they named in various ways.27Each language, 
according to Mauthner, expressed a worldview (weltanschauung), and what was 
called language was always relative to this outlook.28 This just looked like Ludwig 
Wittgenstein’s language game theory,29which also got clearly spelled out in his other 
work: On Certainty.30
George Santayana was a naturalistic skeptic who in his book, Skepticism and 
Animal Faith, insisted that “nothing given, existed as it was given; all belief about 
what was given was open to question.”31He wanted to carry skepticism even higher 
than Hume, hoping that when the full force of skepticism was realized, one could 
appreciate what was in fact absolutely indubitable. 
Albert Camus was an existential skeptic influenced by the skepticism of Soren 
Kierkegaard, Leon Shestove and Frederick Nietzsche. Nietzsche’s skepticism, regarding 
religion and objective values rejected the Fideist mentality of overcoming skeptical 
puzzles by Leap of Faith. Thus, Camus accepted Nietzsche’s view of meaninglessness 
of the world because of the “Death of God.” And being so skeptical about the 
possibility of metaphysical knowledge, like other skeptics, Camus contended that the 
human situation which involves a constant futile effort to achieve understanding and 
meaning in an unintelligible and meaningless world, was absurd.32
In summary, it is now made clear that skepticism, contrary to popular 
opinions, meant generally more than total denial of the possibility of true 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 4:260.
26 Ibid., 4:313.
27 David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Eric Steinberg (Cambridge, 
MA: Hackett Publishing Co., 1993), 7, 2, 59.
28 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1978), 55.
29 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
1981), 23.
30 Ludwig Wittgenstein, On Certainty, ed. G. E. M. Anscombe, and G. H. von Wright, trans. 
Denis Paul (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1969), 2.
31 Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 453.
32 Ibid., 453.
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knowledge. Instead, it meant more of inquiry, and doubt among the members 
of the Platonic Academy. It was true that Sextus Empiricus, Pyrrho and 
Montaigne conceived it as investigation; moderation; and suspension; and 
above all, as a rule of life, it still remains what Descartes saw it to be: a 
methodological attainment of certainty while Hume perceived it as a radical 
means of deconstruction and doubt. 
The contemporary linguistic philosophers like Fritz Mauthner and 
Wittgenstein, on their side also saw skepticism as a tool of relativism where 
language was argued to have meaning only as it expressed a world-outlook 
or language game. Hence George Santayana could reason that it is a process 
of interpretation or Animal Faith. There is no doubt that Albert Camus was 
influenced by Nietzsche and thus was led to pessimism about the human 
situation while Russell moved from pessimism to Gnosticism. 
The above explanations suggest that from antiquity, skepticism has never 
had a uniform practice although it stood for one and the same thing, which is 
suspension of judgement until all doubts have been cleared.
III. Categorization of Skepticism
There have been efforts to classify skepticism as ‘absolute’ or ‘moderate 
skepticism.’ This is because following the above explanations, some skeptics 
tended towards radical skepticism than the others; and so they should be 
called absolute skeptics and the other moderate skeptics.
a. Absolute Skepticism
Absolute skepticism is to be self-stultifying because it tends towards 
nihilism. The word nihilism is originally derived from the Latin word nihil 
which means “nothing.”So, nihilism is the state of mind that doubts the 
existence of something or better put, nihilists are said to be those who 
doubt the reality of existence. In the Webster International Dictionary, 
nihilism is portrayed as
a viewpoint that all traditional values and beliefs are unfounded 
and that all existence is consequently senseless and useless. 
In fact, it is a denial of intrinsic meaning and value of life…a 
doctrine that no reality exists.33
The nihilists were said to deny the relevance of traditional values like laws 
and customs; hence they argued that such values – as natural law – were 
unfounded. It was based on this that some skeptics were branded nihilists.
33 Ibid., 453-454.
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But the question one needs to ask at this point is this: if there were 
skeptics who truly denied that there were intrinsic values and meaning to life 
when they presented their arguments as meaningful, does that truly make 
them nihilists? The answer to this question is a capital “No,” because nihilism 
is not defensible in the face of their denial of intrinsic value and meaning to 
life because to say that existence is senseless implies that their arguments 
were also senseless in so far as they were part of existence. In that case, there 
were no real nihilists. Instead, there were simply skeptics in the strictest sense 
of it.
Again, we should note that different nihilist positions existed. While 
some held variously those human values were baseless, others held that life 
was meaningless, and still there were those who believed that knowledge was 
impossible or that some set of entities did not exist. In whichever positions 
or forms there were, the same question and answer still applied: If there were 
skeptics who truly denied that there were intrinsic values and meaning to life 
when they presented their arguments as meaningful, does that truly make 
them nihilists? The answer again remains “No,” because nihilism could not 
be defensible in the face of their denial of intrinsic value and meaning to 
life when they maintained that existence was senseless. And this would have 
implied that their arguments were also senseless in so far as they were part 
of existence.
Now the fact that radical skeptics like Nietzsche and Russell were 
normally quite notorious could not still account for the reason why many 
would mistakenly identify their skepticism with nihilism, i.e., as extreme 
position. Nietzsche’s crisis of nihilism derived from two central concepts: the 
destruction of higher values and the opposition to the affirmation of life. 
His writing, which, according to Lawrence J. Hatab34contained significant 
references to nihilism,35 issued a radical attack on traditional belief system, 
and often echoed many of the pronouncements of nihilism. Yet this would 
not make Nietzsche to be frequently taken to be a nihilist. Instead, he was a 
skeptic in the strictest sense of the term skepticism.
On this count, Richard Schacht36 demonstrated that Nietzsche had a dual 
attitude towards nihilism. For him, the question of whether Nietzsche was 
a true nihilist must be answered in both ways of Yes and No; affirmatively, 
if nihilism meant a denial of traditional belief systems, and negatively if it 
meant the denial of any value, meaning or truth in the world. According to 
him, Nietzsche accepted a restricted form of nihilism that denied a realm of 
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values. Also, Nietzsche saw complete nihilism (as here defined) as decadent, 
dangerous, and something to overcome. In other words, if Nietzsche saw 
complete nihilism as dangerous, decadent and as something to overcome, it 
means that he could not have been taken as a nihilist in that strict sense of 
the word. And since his version of nihilism was rooted in the Christian-moral 
tradition, it would be safe to say as Schacht did insist that Nietzsche cannot 
also be considered a nihilist in the strict sense of the term because even in 
his denial, he advocated for such doctrines as the will to power and eternal 
recurrence. And based on this, talking about absolute skepticism would 
amount to a mirage.
b. Moderate Skepticism
On the other hand, moderate skepticism was considered as constructive 
and served as both a philosophical methodology and epistemological 
attitude of doubts aiding knowledge. Also, moderate skepticism was 
thought as the moderate mood of doubt about some several, or single 
thing, but never everything. The moderate skeptics were said to be 
known by what they doubt and how long they doubted. 
In Samuel Stumpf’s Introduction to Philosophy, Sextus Empiricus was 
said to be a moderate skeptic; hence he argued that evident matters 
such as whether it was night or day raised no serious problems of 
knowledge. In this category were evident requirements for social and 
personal tranquility, for we knew that customs and laws bound societies 
together. But non-evident matters, as for example, whether the stuff 
of nature was made of atoms, some fiery substances, did raise some 
intellectual controversies.37
So, based on this, moderate skepticism was seen to be 
“partial,”“sensory,”“rational,” and “methodic.” It was also said to be 
relative. Under moderate skepticism were also ethical, religious, and other 
forms of skepticism, which restricted doubt to definite areas. But unlike 
what was called “nihilist skeptics,” who “doubt almost everything,” the 
moderate skeptic doubted only metaphysical knowledge since evident 
matters posed no puzzle. The empiricists and positivists were said to 
belong to this group since for them, opinions, statements and matters 
were to be doubted if and only if they were obscure.38
Many have categorized Descartes as a moderate skeptic because 
in his Meditation on First Philosophy, he had this to say: “It will not 
37 Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, vol. 19 (Springfield, MA: Marriam Webster, 
1987), 1528.
38 John P. Dougherty, ed., The Review of Metaphysics, vol. 36 (New York: A.M.S., 1983), 846-
847.
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be necessary for me to show that all my opinions are false, which are 
nothing but illusions and dreams.”39On another occasion, he added: 
Whatever I have up till now accepted as most true, I have 
acquired from the senses or through the senses. But from time to 
time, I have found out that the senses deceive. And it is prudence 
never to trust completely those who have deceived us once.40
But to affirm or deny that Descartes was truly a moderate skeptic would 
depend on how one is able to understand the fact that Descartes’ philosophy 
was dominated by his personal quest for certainty. Although this was not 
a preoccupation peculiar or unique or him and/or his age, there were such 
traumatic transition periods in the history of understanding such that it 
became more obvious that old assumptions did not work any longer since 
they no longer fitted the experience of the world. So, it was at such time like 
this that philosophic mind as Descartes’ were driven to critical reassessment 
of the very foundation of what he already knew. 
So, Descartes’ background as a geometrician really paved way for him 
in his search for the indubitable truth or certainty that he required. However, 
using the method of geometry to think about the world, Descartes found the 
foundation of such “self-evident” propositions upon which whole geometrical 
systems can be built. It was this “methodic” form of skepticism that led 
him to doubt everything – de omnibus dubitandum; suspending belief in the 
knowledge he learned from childhood. In his First Meditation on the First 
Philosophy,41he reiterated his firm doubt on all those things “which I allowed 
myself in youth to be persuaded without having inquired into their truth.”42So 
Descartes’ doubt was methodic; hence it served him as a deliberate strategy 
for proceeding toward certainty. In that case, and like the rest of others 
before him, the so-called absolute or radical skeptics – Descartes became a 
doubter not by nature, but by necessity. For what he really wanted was to be 
secure so he could stop doubting.
It was this methodic suspension of belief that really got him to the point 
where he could no longer doubt his existence. Then it became clear to him 
that what he couldn’t doubt any longer was the fact that he was the same 
39 Lawrence J. Hatab, “Nietzsche, Nihilism and Meaning,” The Personalist Forum 3, no. 2 
(1987): 91-111.
40 Omoregbe, Epistemology, 168
41 René Descartes, “Meditations on First Philosophy,” in The Philosophical Works of Descartes, 
vol. 1, ed. Elizabeth S. Haldane, and G. R. T. Ross (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1911), 28.
42 Stumpf, 120.
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man doubting. And this realization led him to the knowledge of his own 
existence, for if he could doubt the existence of every other thing; he could 
not doubt his own existence, for he had to exist first before he could doubt. 
On this truth, Descartes became the author of his famous phrase in Western 
philosophy: Cogito ergo sum, or, originally, Je pense, donc je sui – “I think, 
therefore I am or (exist)!” This secure anchor, no doubt, became the basis of 
Descartes’ philosophical system, and he proceeded to infer the rest of his 
“truths.”
The lesson here is that both Nietzsche and Descartes would have differed 
in one way or the other, for they would have had their individual methods 
still within the skeptics’ tradition, but this did not qualify one to become 
an absolute skeptic or nihilist and the other moderate skeptics. There is no 
reason to say either of them is a radical skeptics or moderate skeptic than the 
other. The truth is that both of them qualified as both moderate as well as 
absolute skeptics no matter what meaning we give to it. So there is no reason 
to see one as absolute or radical and the other as moderate. After all, nihilism 
would never have been defensible in the face of their denial of intrinsic value 
and meaning to life since to say that existence was senseless implied that 
their arguments were also senseless in so far as they were part of existence. 
IV. Comments on the relationship between Ataraxia and/or ‘Epoche’ and/or 
‘Aponia’
Briefly, we shall comment on how ataraxia relates to epoche and aponia. There 
has been effort to equate ataraxia with the word epoche and aponia. This is 
wrong because they were not meant to be the same thing ab initio. While 
ataraxia is a Greek word literally translated as “imperturbability,”“equanimity,” 
or “tranquility,” and which first appeared in the works of Pyrrho though 
subsequently used by Epicurus and the Stoics, it does not mean the same as 
epoche or aponia. Ataraxia refers to “freedom from worry and anxiety.” In 
other words, it was “a state of calmness of mind in the face of seemingly 
intractable disagreement.”Among the Pyrrhonists, ataraxia was necessary 
for bringing about eudemonia (happiness) for a person, representing life’s 
ultimate purpose. The method of achieving ataraxia was through achieving 
epoche. 
Epoche on the other hand, is the suspension of judgement according to 
Sextus Empiricus.43 And it is not the same as ataraxia, although the latter is 
relationally induced or brought about by the former for the sake of eudemonia. 
The issue is that we are first brought to epoche and then to ataraxia.
43 Jonathan Barnes, ‘Introduction,” in Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Skepticism, trans. Julia 
Annas, and Jonathan Barnes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), xix ff.
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For the Epicureans, the concept of ataraxia was highly valued because 
of how pleasure was understood as highest good. For them, those who 
achieved freedom from physical disturbance were in a state of aponia, that 
was understood as “the absence of physical pain.” Therefore, the concept 
of ataraxia is thus far removed from the sense in which the Epicureans used 
the concept of ‘aponia’ because those who achieved freedom from mental 
disturbance were in a state of ataraxia.44
This distinction is very important to our discussion because while epoche 
induces ataraxia, ataraxia is not the same as aponia; hence the “absence 
of physical pain” is not one and the same thing as “the absence of mental 
disturbance.” Therefore, as epoche in Pyrrhonism it is indicated “a suspension 
of judgment or belief for the sake of inner peace, especially while faced with 
a precipice,” the state of ataraxia was brought about by eschewing beliefs 
(dogma) about thoughts and perceptions;45 hence the values of skepticism.
V. The values of skepticism
The values of skepticism are both theoretical and practical. Theoretically, 
the strength of skepticism lies not in whether it is tenable as a position but in 
the force of the arguments of its proposers against the claims of dogmatic 
philosophers. Popkin was said to have argued that without skepticism, probably 
we could not distinguish enthusiasm, prejudice, or superstition from serious 
or meaningful beliefs. Perceived in this direction, we can describe skepticism 
as an epistemological fiery furnace where opinions are purified like gold. 
Again, Popkin was further said to have contended that skepticism was 
instrumental to the birth of the modern epistemology at the hands of 
Descartes who was referred to as a moderate and methodological skeptic. 
This point is made clearer, of course because while the metaphysical frame 
of the later rationalists like Leibniz and Spinoza was merely an advancement 
of Descartes’, the all-important epistemological contributions of the British 
empiricists was a response thesis to Descartes. Kant admitted that Hume’s 
skepticism woke him up from his dogmatic slumber. No wonder he is called 
the father of modern philosophy. 
On the practical level, what strikes the mind immediately is the classical 
skepticism of Michel Eyquem de Montaigne who lived from 1553 to 1592 
in France. For Montaigne, skepticism neither meant pessimism in all things 
as a mood, nor license as a rule to do anything one wants. Instead, it was a 
44 Frederich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, trans. Walter Kaufman (New York: Modern Library, 
1968), 67; Richard Schacht, “Nietzsche and Nihilism,” in Nietzsche: A Collection of Critical 
Essays, ed. Robert Solomon (Garden City, NY: Anchor Press, 1973), 165.
45 Stumpf, 121.
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source for a positive affirmation of all the facets of human life. That was why 
he advised people to start their philosophy of life by reflecting upon matters 
close at hand; such that, a good place to begin would be one’s own personal 
experience, given that “every man carries within himself, the whole conditions 
of humanity.”46 For this reason, Montaigne felt that whatever proved useful 
to himself might also serve useful to someone else. 
This frame of mind reflects Kant’s categorical imperative: “Act only on 
that maxim whereby thou canst at the same time will that it should become 
a universal law.”47 This maxim, of course, points to the Golden Rule: “Do 
unto others as you would like others to do to you.” And in order to live up to 
this rule, Montaigne considered “contentment” as basic in life. Contentment 
can only be achieved through mental tranquility, but mental tranquility itself 
is achieved, according to Montaigne, when people concern themselves with 
existential phenomena; leaving out metaphysical problems to wane and die 
on their own. 
However, Montaigne regrettably pointed out that the saddest spectacle 
of all is to find people formulating final answers on questions that are far 
too subtle and variable for such a treatment. The final folly of this attempt 
to capture the perfect and permanent truth is the mind of fanaticism and 
dogmatism. By the above lamentation, Montaigne attacked both the system-
building philosophers who claim to be the unriddlers of the universe, and also 
the religious fanatics who caused wars and fierce religious persecution in the 
bid to perpetrate one kind of absolutive law or the other. 
For those who could perpetrate any kind of evil to humanity under 
any guise, Montaigne blamed such cruelty as fanaticism caused by lack 
of inner peace. He then believed genuinely that a mood of constructive 
skepticism could prevent such an outburst of cruelty, because, “in the true 
skepticism, human energies could be directed toward manageable subjects 
and purposes.”48 According to Stumpf, Montaigne “adopted as his own, the 
central insight of classical skepticism, using this formula: ‘I stop-I examine-I 
take for my guide the ways of the world and the experience of the senses.’”49 
The above principle looks like the Socratic injunction, “Man know thy self, for 
an unexamined life is not worth living.” 
Another great figure is Socrates. The skepticism of Socrates was visible 
in the way he engages his listener to argumentation. Unlike the Sophists who 
tried to show that truth or knowledge was impossible, Socrates accepted the 
46 Descartes, The Philosophical Works,12.
47 Immanuel Kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. and ed. Mary Gregor 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 4:421.
48 Ibid.,12.
49 Descartes,Meditations, 23.
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possibility of truth and tried to link knowing and doing. For him, knowledge 
was virtue, and ignorance was the cause of vice. 
Socrates’ engagement in the “dialectic” was never for end destructive 
of truth nor to develop pragmatic skills among lawyers and politicians, but 
to achieve concepts of truth and goodness. His clash with the Athenian 
government on account of being a “corrupter of the youth,” and for which 
he paid with his life, got him the reputation of “an intellectual dealing in 
paradoxes and, worse still, of thinking freely on matters about which many 
Athenians believed that discussions should be closed.”50He was regarded a 
true skeptic; hence he taught the youth to live authentic lives as he did.51
VI. Should Skepticism then be discredited?
Those who misunderstood the meaning and scope of skepticism thought it 
was opposed to knowledge hence it should be resisted or discredited. But 
contrary to them and from our discussion so far, skepticism is supportive of 
knowledge. Wittgenstein once thought he had detested skepticism without 
knowing he soaked himself deeply in constructive skepticism although 
he would still not like himself to be identified as a skeptic. This truth is 
contained in the work of Garfield when he admitted that Wittgenstein, of 
course, frequently denied that he was a skeptic. He writes: “Skepticism is not 
irrefutable, but obvious nonsense…”52 But I would argue that the position 
Wittgenstein denotes by “skepticism” is what I am calling ‘nihilism.’53In that 
sense, both skepticism and nihilism meant the same thing for Garfield.54
However, the type of response Wittgenstein repeatedly offered to 
the skeptical problems posed by nihilistic arguments was characteristically 
skeptical. The point is that one needs to be skeptical to doubt the certainty 
of skeptical arguments. Hence philosophers as Wittgenstein and others 
who put up healthy arguments against skepticism were simply being truly 
skeptical. 
Obviously, the skeptics contributed a great deal to the development 
of epistemology in Western philosophy by challenging the claim to know 
and the basis of such knowledge. The critical and sometimes devastating 
challenges of the skeptics spurred the epistemologists on to continually 
re-examine the nature, the basis and the justification of knowledge. 
50 Jane Friedman, “Why Suspend Judging?” Nous 51, no. 2 (2017): 302-326.
51 Jane Friedman, “Suspended Judgment,” Philosophical Studies 162, no. 2 (2013): 165-181.
52 Stumpf, 120-121.
53 Ibid., 120.
54 Jay L. Garfield, “Epoche and Śūnyatā: Skepticism East and West,” Philosophy East and West 
40, no. 3 (1990): 304.
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Epistemologists had to do this in order to find answers to the challenges of 
the skeptics, and to refute them.
One of them was Goodman who criticized skepticism on the thinking that 
it obstructed knowledge because of its application of suspension therapy. 
Indeed, he writes:
Like the positivist and the radical empiricist, he (the skeptic) 
is barred by his own principle from going beyond phenomena 
at all by way of interpretation. The result is that none of the 
conundrums or antinomies which arise in experience itself or 
our ‘natural’ responses to it can be confronted by him in any 
way…The net out-come of the skeptic’s perfection of his critical 
capabilities is their complete suspension.55
This is a clear criticism but what he did not realize was the fact that while 
“suspension therapy” seem apparently to be negative, it gave room for 
investigation and convictions through which inviolable certainty could be 
attempted on something (if probable), instead of hastily condemning that 
out of ignorance or dogmatically accepting it out of myopia. It is therefore 
wrong to accuse the skeptics as unable to resolve most of the questions they 
generated; after all, skeptics did not think that in philosophy, questions were 
more important than answers. 
The antimonies which Sextus Empiricus enjoined them to formulate were 
not meant to be resolved since that was the best way to show the dogmatists 
that they may not have found the complete truth as they claim. It is not also 
true that the skeptics were intellectually redundant and inactive in philosophic 
enterprise as infants, unphilosophic adults or common men. Skeptics were 
active men with strong intellectual and philosophic mind.56
VII. Conclusion
Man is a being constantly in search of true knowledge. Skepticism afforded 
man that single opportunity to sift knowledge before consuming. Hence 
skepticism was both a philosophical method and an epistemological attitude 
towards knowledge. No doubts, there were various skeptics in history. While 
some skeptics were seen as extreme, others were regarded as moderate. 
In whichever way or form one found himself, both extreme skepticism and 
moderate skepticism were one and the same. They were led by one single 
passion: investigation and inquiry into the truth of things before consuming. 
55 Stumpf, 215.
56 Dougherty, 846-847.
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Whether some doubts of the skeptics were directed to almost everything, 
including knowledge and existence, even to the point of denying them 
possible existence or directed only to the possibility of arriving at indubitable 
truth, skepticism remains a method of inquiry towards certain knowledge. The 
moderate skeptics said things existed and knowledge was possible, but the 
problem lied with discovering a reliable criterion of indubitable certainty. The 
so-called radical skeptics believed this too. 
In the final discussion of this work therefore, it is now clear that skepticism 
should not be discredited. Instead, it should be applauded and accepted for 
what it is. The doctrine of skepticism demands that whoever wants certain 
knowledge should and must proceed through doubt. It is no longer the case 
ordinarily, that one would accept entirely all that one is told simply because 
it comes from a sage, or a tradition. On this note, the paper concludes that 
the best way to certainty or rather whoever wants knowledge should proceed 
through doubt.
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